Lynn G. Foster v. Evelyn L. Saunders; Saunders & Saunders; Gary Couillard; and Cathie I. Foster : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Lynn G. Foster v. Evelyn L. Saunders; Saunders &
Saunders; Gary Couillard; and Cathie I. Foster :
Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David W. Scofield; Peters Scofield Price; Attorneys for Appellant; Richard C. Henriksen, Jr.; James E.
Seaman; Henriksen & Henriksen, PC; Attorneys for Cathie I. Foster; Matthew Lalli; Amy Sorensen;
Nathan E. Wheatley; Snell & Wilmer, LLP; Attorneys for Evelyn L. Saunders; Gary R. Couillard;
Gary R. Couillard, CPA; Pro Se.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Lynn G. Foster v. Evelyn L. Saunders, No. 20040527 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5080
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYNN G. FOSTER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
EVELYN L. SAUNDERS; SAUNDERS & 
SAUNDERS; GARY COUILLARD; and 
CATHIE I. FOSTER, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appeal No. 20040527-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF THE HONORABLE 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Richard C. Henriksen, Jr. 
James E. Seaman 
HENRIKSEN & HENRIKSEN, P.O. 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Cathie I. Foster 
Matthew Lalli 
Amy Sorenson 
Nathan E. Wheatley 
SNELL&WILMER, LLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Attorneys for Evelyn L. Saunders 
Gary R. Couillard 
Gary R. Couillard/CPA 
184 "S" Street 
Salt Lake City Utah 84103 
ProSe 
, u COURT OF APP**1-8 
UTAH 
D O C U ! ^ T 
50 
DOCKET NO 
5&1 -Cfr 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB 172005 
David W.Scof ie ld-4140 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
A Professional Corporation 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)322-2002 
Facsimile: (801)322-2003 
E-mail: dws@psplawyers.com 
Attorneys for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYNN G. FOSTER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
EVELYN L. SAUNDERS; SAUNDERS & 
SAUNDERS; GARY COUILLARD; and 
CATHIE 1. FOSTER, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appeal No. 20040527-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF THE HONORABLE 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Richard C. Henriksen, Jr. 
James E. Seaman 
HENRIKSEN & HENRIKSEN, P.C. 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Cathie I. Foster 
Matthew Lalli 
Amy Sorenson 
Nathan E. Wheatley 
SNELL & WILMER, LLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Attorneys for Evelyn L. Saunders 
Gary R. Couillard 
Gary R. Couillard/CPA 
184 "S" Street 
Salt Lake City Utah 84103 
ProSe 
David W.Scof ie ld-4140 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
A Professional Corporation 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)322-2002 
Facsimile: (801)322-2003 
E-mail: dws@psplawyers.com 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE O F CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. DEFENDANTS ESSENTIALLY IGNORE THE CONTROLLING LAW THAT ESTABLISHES 
THAT LYNN HAS ADEQUATELY PLEADED A CLAIM UNDER THE TORT OF WRONGFUL 
INITIATION, USE AND/OR CONTINUATION OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS, NAMELY, GILBERT 
AND THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 674(a) 1 
II. THE OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY BY FOSTER FAMILY PROPERTIES, L.C. AND 
FOSTER RENTALS, L.C. WAS IN NO WAY IN ISSUE IN THE DIVORCE ACTION 10 
III. SLANDER OF TITLE Is AN INJURY To REAL PROPERTY 12 
IV. CLAIM PRECLUSION CANNOT BE DECIDED ON THE PLEADINGS 13 
V. CATHIE'S ARGUMENTS ON DUTY, LEGAL CAUSE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE 
GROUNDLESS, CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CATHIE AND 
COUILLARD ON COUNTS IV AND V 15 
CONCLUSION 16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 17 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Baird v. Intermountain School Federal Credit Union, 
555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976) 3 
Bass v. Planned Management Servs., Inc., 
761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988) 13 
Bidna v. Rosen, 
19 Cal.App.4th 27, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 7-9 
Crowley v. Katleman, 
8 Cal. 4th 666, 881 P.2d 1083, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Cal. 1994) 7, 10 
Gilbert v. Ince, 
1999 UT 65, 981 P.2d 841 1-7 
Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 
890 P.2d 895 (Okla. 1995) 6 
Hill v. Carlstrom, 
216 Or. 300, 338 P.2d 645 (1959) 8 
Howard v. Hudson, 
259 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958) 13 
Karenius v. Merchants' Protective Association, 
65 Utah 183, 235 P. 880 (1925) 6 
Maoris & Assocs., 
2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 14 
Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 14 
Merlet v. Rizzo, 
64 Cal. App. 4th 53, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 83 (1998) 7 
Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance, 
2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663 13, 14 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Patapoffv. Vollstedt's, Inc., 
230 Or. 266, 369 P.2d 691 (1962) 8 
Sears v. Riemersma, 
655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982) 4 
Vazquez v. Reeves, 
138 Or.App. 153, 907 P.2d 254 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) 8 
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 
910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996) 4 
Zamos v. Stroud, 
32 Cal.4th 958, 87 P.3d 802, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 (2004) 7 
Statutes: 
ORS 20.105 9 
Rules 
OR. R. CIV. P. 17 9 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) 1, 13, 16 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56 1,16 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 59 10 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(e) 4, 10 
Other Authority 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (West 1991) 4 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 2-7 
Restatement of Torts (Second) § 674(a) 1,3,7 
iii 
ARGUMENT 
Appellees/Defendants Evelyn L. Saunders and Saunders & Saunders filed their 
Appellees' Brief on December 15, 2004 [hereinafter "Lawyers' Brief]. Appellee/ 
Defendant Cathie I. Foster filed her Appellee's Brief also on December 15, 2004 
[hereinafter "Cathie's Brief']. Appellee/Defendant Gary Couillard filed no brief. The 
arguments in the Lawyers' Brief and Cathie's Brief often overlap and in those 
circumstances, to the extent possible, they will be replied to in a single argument. It is 
important to remember, when reviewing the arguments in both briefs, that this case is 
being reviewed, on Counts l-lll of the Amended Complaint, for a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, and on Counts IV-V, on a Rule 56 grant of summary judgment, so the 
standards of review are as set forth in Appellant Lynn Foster ("Lynn's) Opening Brief. 
I. DEFENDANTS ESSENTIALLY IGNORE THE CONTROLLING LAW THAT 
ESTABLISHES THAT LYNN HAS ADEQUATELY PLEADED A CLAIM UNDER THE 
TORT O F WRONGFUL INITIATION, USE AND/OR CONTINUATION O F CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS, NAMELY, GILBERT AND THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) 
§ 674(a). 
The Lawyers' Brief and Cathie's Brief each incorrectly argue that the tort cause 
of action pleaded in Count I of the Amended Complaint, for Wrongful Initiation, Use 
And/Or Continuation of Civil Proceedings, R. 17-28, exists in the state of Utah strictly to 
remedy a wrongful initiation of a lawsuit, and no other litigation abuses. See Lawyers' 
Brief at 7-15, Cathie's Brief at 9-10. As shown below, these arguments entirely miss 
the very purpose of the tort, as discussed by the most recent, and controlling, Utah 
Supreme Court decision, Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65, 981 P.2d 841 [hereinafter 
"Gilbert'], namely, to provide redress for acts of abusive litigation, not sustainable by 
1 
probable cause and engaged for an improper purpose. 
Lynn prevailed against Cathie in the divorce proceeding on Cathie's claim that 
she was entitled to payments of alimony even after Lynn died, a claim that is unheard of 
in divorce law. The claim was not asserted for a proper adjudication of its merits. 
Defendants argue that Lynn is exempted from relief under the tort because Cathie filed 
for, and the parties were granted, a divorce, despite Lynn's success in defeating such 
claim that his alimony obligation continues beyond his death. That is one among many 
claims that would be subject to his pleaded claim herein, which claims in the divorce 
were unsupported by probable cause and asserted for an improper purpose. 
The language of the very sections of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
[hereinafter "RESTATEMENT"] expressly adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Gilbert, 
as well as the comments to the RESTATEMENT1 and the case law cited by Plaintiff, to 
which Defendants have offered no response, all disavow Defendants' contentions as to 
the limitations of the abusive litigation torts. The candor of the entire Lawyers' Brief is 
called into question by the fact that they relegate the controlling Gilbert Utah Supreme 
Court decision - which is where the Utah Supreme Court expressly adopts the 
RESTATEMENTS formulation of the torts - to an offhand reference in a single footnote, 
and then only for the proposition that the torts have, in Utah, "historically been known 
variously as either 'abuse of process' or 'malicious prosecution.'" Lawyers' Brief at 11 n. 
2. Since the Gilbert adoption of the RESTATEMENT formulation establishes the current 
1The Utah Supreme Court expressly did not adopt the comments to the 
RESTATEMENT, leaving the analysis of those matters for another day. See id. fl 19, 981 
P.2d at 846 n. 11. 
2 
law on this tort in Utah, such discounted treatment of Gilbert, and the RESTATEMENT, is 
a telling commentary on the hollowness of the Lawyers' Briefs presentation of 
argument about non-controlling, pre-Gilbert, i.e., pre-RESTATEMENT cases. 
Cathie's Brief at least acknowledges that Gilbert adopted the RESTATEMENTS 
formulation of the tort. See Cathy's Brief at 10-11. Cathie then candidly concedes that, 
under Gilbert, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant "has brought claims without 
probable cause." Cathie's Brief at 11 (emphasis added). Cathie then reverts to a pre-
Gilbert definition of probable cause as requiring a "showing of purposeful harassment or 
annoyance and, in most cases, malice." Id. at 11 (citing Baird v. Intermountain School 
Federal Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976)). The RESTATEMENT, as adopted in 
Gilbert, makes clear that such element is in fact met by pleading that a claim is brought 
"for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which 
the proceedings are based," Gilbert, 1999 UT 65, fi 19, 981 P.2d 841, 845-46 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT § 674 and equating to Baird). Lynn has expressly pleaded these 
elements in Amended Complaint fflj 21-26 R. 22. 
Both the Lawyers' Brief and Cathie's Brief argue that the semantic difference 
between a "theory" of recovery and a claim for relief is so significant at the pleading 
stage that Lynn's use of the word "theories," as used by Judge Hilder in the divorce 
action, see Amended Complaint fl 11 R. 20, precludes any possible claim from being 
stated. Lynn has been unable to find any authority from any jurisdiction holding that 
such a semantic difference in those terms could preclude any set of facts upon which 
relief could be granted, and Defendants here cited no such holding. 
3 
Indeed, if only one theory of recovery sustains a claim for relief, the two 
necessarily collapse into each other. However, even if, for the sake of argument only, 
there were some technical distinction of semantics,2 such a consideration would not be 
a proper basis to dismiss at the pleadings stage. UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(e) expressly 
abolished any technical forms of pleading. See Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 
1110 (Utah 1982)("Utah has adopted what is generally referred to as 'notice pleading.' 
Rule 8(e), Utah R. Civ. P., specifically provides that 'no technical forms of pleadings or 
motions are required.'") See generally Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 
P.2d 1218, 1221-22 (Utah 1996)(refusing dismissal on grounds of semantic error in 
pleading). 
Thus, the fact that Lynn chose to use Judge Hilder's language is not dispositive, 
nor is Judge Hilder's own choice of words. Lynn's pleaded claims are adequate.3 The 
efforts of the defendants to argue that the entire divorce lawsuit must, in its entirety, 
have been brought without probable cause and for a purpose other than the just 
adjudication of an entitlement to divorce, see Lawyers' Brief at 7-12 and Cathie's Brief 
at 10-12, is simply unsupported under Gilbert or the RESTATEMENT. First, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Gilbert recognized that it was dealing with classes of torts "involving 
2Any such claimed distinction seems unlikely to exist. "Claim" is defined as: "To 
demand as one's own or as one's right; to assert; to urge; to insist. A cause of 
action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 247 (West 1991). 
3Cathie's claim that she was entitled to receive alimony after Lynn was dead, her 
claim that she owned real property that she had long ago conveyed by quit-claim deed 
to separate legal entities, in one of which neither she nor Lynn even had any ownership 
interest, and various other claims asserted, see R. 647-654, on all of which Lynn 
prevailed, are all subject to the tort's remedies. 
4 
abusive manipulation of public judicial resources." Gilbert, 1999 UT 65 fl 16, 981 P.2d 
at 845. Such a broad characterization of the reach of the torts belies the narrow 
interpretation of their reach, as argued by defendants. 
In adopting the RESTATEMENT, the Utah Supreme Court specifically sought to 
bring analytical clarity to litigation abuse torts: "To preserve analytical clarity with 
respect to the species of torts permitting suit for misuse of judicial proceedings, we 
apply the RESTATEMENTS formulation of wrongful use of civil proceedings." Id. H 19, 
981 P.2d at 846. In order to preserve such analytical clarity, one must do what 
defendants avoid, namely, focus on Gilbert and the RESTATEMENT itself, neither of which 
counsel the restrictions that defendants argue. ] 
The defendants' arguments simply seek a reversion to analytical confusion. If 
the defendants' proffered arguments about the scope of the abusive litigation torts were 
correct, the Utah Supreme Court in Gilbert, would have found unnecessary its analytical 
statement4 that: "Gilbert likewise failed to negate probable cause on Gunnoe's 
allegation that she acted under a conflict of interest." Id. lj 25, 981 P.2d at 847 
(emphasis added). A "theory" of "conflict of interest" would not be subject to a probable 
cause analysis under the tort as argued by defendants, yet the Utah Supreme Court 
found it essential to determine such issue as part of its rationale for holding that 
Gilbert's claim against Ince, founded upon a conflict of interest theory, failed. 
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court itself described its analysis as directed to a 
^Gilbert was decided during a jury trial, on a motion for directed verdict. See 
1999 UT65U 13, 981 P.2d at 844. It was therefore decided under a different standard 
of review than is applicable to this case. See id. fl 14. 
5 
single "allegation" of a "claim:" "Although the information upon which Ince acted in 
alleging conflict of interest was somewhat tenuous, it cannot be said that the 
inference provided insufficient probable cause for the claim." Id. fl 26, 981 P.2d at 848 
(emphasis added). Thus, all of the Lawyer Briefs parsing of other cases' gratuitous 
references to "proceedings," "lawsuits," "suits," "civil actions," and the like, see, e.g. 
Lawyers' Brief at 8-9 & n.1, is for naught, especially when, contrary to the apparently-
desired impression offered by their citations, not one of the cited cases holds that 
individual claims or, as the Utah Supreme Court analyzed in Gilbert, "allegations" was 
immune from the abusive litigation torts. The Lawyers' Brief, at 11-2 & n. 4, also cites 
Karenius v. Merchants' Protective Association, 65 Utah 183, 235 P. 880 (1925), 
claiming that it stands for the proposition that the abusive litigation torts may not be 
applied in multiple-claim actions if a single claim is valid. This case predates the 
adoption of the RESTATEMENT in Gilbert by three quarters of a century. More significant, 
however, is the fact omitted from the Lawyers' Brief, namely, that Karenius' own 
attorney acknowledged that Karenius' claim "[was] not one for malicious abuse of 
process, nor for malicious prosecution without probable cause." Karenius, 235 P. at 
883. Since the pleaded claim was conceded by Karenius' counsel not to be one of the 
abusive litigation torts, the case could have no bearing here. 
Neither the Lawyers' Brief nor Cathie's Brief even attempts to address the 
Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 904 (Okla. 1995) decision cited in Lynn's 
Opening Brief at 18 n.3, which supports exactly what the Utah Supreme Court did in 
Gilbert, in analyzing the allegation of conflict of interest as the predicate for a breach of 
6 
fiduciary duty claim. The defendants, in their arguments, also ignore the plain language 
of the RESTATEMENT, itself, as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, which uses the 
phrase "the claim" as the specific object of what has been brought forth for adjudication: 
"he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than that of securing 
the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are based . . . " 
RESTATEMENT § 674(a)(emphasis added).5 Such resounding silence on these important 
citations speaks to the lack of merit in defendants' arguments.6 
The Lawyers Brief, makes note that the state of California has a bright line policy 
rule, created by the courts, against applying the abusive litigation torts in the area of 
family law, citing to Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal.App.4th 27, 35 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251 (Cal. Ct. 
5This RESTATEMENT section was expressly adopted as the law of Utah in Gilbert, 
fl 19, 981 P.2d at 845-46, yet not one word about this section appears in either of 
defendants' briefs. The plain language of this section brings within reach of the tort a 
litigant's acts undertaken without probable cause. In other words, it could be initiation 
of a lawsuit, the continuation in asserting a particular claim or any other act of litigation 
abuse that fits the elements of the tort - there is no limitation beyond the expressed 
elements. 
defendants instead seek to distinguish Lynn's citation of the en banc decision of 
the California Supreme Court in Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 694, 881 P.2d 
1083, 1099, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 402 (Cal. 1994)(en banc), arguing that a decision by 
the First District of Division 2 of the California Court of Appeals "explains" the Supreme 
Court's en banc decision. See Lawyers' Brief at 13 (citing Merlet v. Rizzo, 64 Cal. App. 
4th 53, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 83 (1998)). The Merlet Court purported to know better than the 
en banc California Supreme Court, the importance of the Supreme Court's 
pronouncements on the abusive litigation tort in its reversal of a dismissal in Crowley. 
In Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal.4th 958, 87 P.3d 802, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 (2004), the 
California Supreme Court explained that Merlet "simply involved application of the 
familiar rule that subsidiary procedural actions cannot be the basis for malicious 
prosecution claims." Zamos, 32 Cal. 4th at 969 n.8, 87 P.3d at 809 n.8, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 
at 63 n.8. So the true issue for decision in Merlet was not even broad enough for the 
Merlet Court to be offering any explanation of the Crowley rationale, and its 
"explanation," lacks any value compared to the express pronouncements and 
expressed rationale of the Crowley decision in reversing a dismissal upon demurrer. 
7 
App. 1993). Bidna, for its rationale, relied entirely on imaginary effects of abusive tort 
litigation over divorce cases. See 19 Cal. App. 4th at 30. There was no empirical 
evidence before the Court to support its ruminations. Indeed, although the abusive 
litigation tort has been around for scores of years, the veritable dearth of reported 
decisions concerning its application to family law matters counsels a contrary 
conclusion. The Oregon Court of Appeals, addressing that very defect in Bidna's logic 
rejected any such hard and fast rule. After exposing the lack of any basis in fact to 
support Bidna's sweeping policy declaration, the Oregon court reversed the dismissal of 
an abusive litigation complaint that arose out of family law proceedings. See Vazquez 
v. Reeves, 138 Or.App. 153, 159, 907 P.2d 254, 257 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).7 If such a 
7The Oregon Court of Appeals refuted Bidna's rationale as follows: 
Perkins urges us to adopt the reasoning of Bidna v. Rosen, 19 
Cal.App.4th 27, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251 (1993). There, the court declined to 
extend the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings to family law cases for 
three reasons: (1) because of the underlying bitterness and emotional 
distress involved in many family law disputes, the task of distinguishing 
between "ordinary" suits and "malicious" suits is extremely difficult; (2) 
attorney fee awards sufficiently discourage frivolous litigation and 
adequately ameliorate the effects of such litigation; and (3) extending 
wrongful use of civil proceedings claims to family law disputes could have 
a chilling effect on the commencement of meritorious actions. Id. 23 
Cal.Rptr.2d at 257. 
Although Bidna's rationales seem initially plausible, they are 
ultimately unpersuasive. To begin with, we do not believe that the 
potential difficulty of sorting out malicious, from ordinary, litigation 
in the family law context is materially greater than in other species 
of litigation to which the tort has been applied. See, e.g., Patapoff 
v. Vollstedt's, Inc., 230 Or. 266, 369 P.2d 691 (1962) (claim 
predicated on initiation of involuntary bankruptcy); Hill v. Carlstrom, 
216 Or. 300, 305, 338 P.2d 645 (1959) (claim predicated on 
initiation of insanity proceedings). 
(continued...) 
8 
7(...continued) 
Nor do we accept Bidna's second assumption, that awards of attorney 
fees and sanctions adequately deter the prosecution of baseless and bad 
faith family law litigation and adequately compensate for losses from such 
litigation. Here, for example, plaintiffs sought damages for emotional 
distress and loss of comfort and companionship caused by the allegedly 
wrongful removal of the children from their mother's care. Moreover, the 
availability of attorney fees and sanctions, see ORS 20.105; [FN5] 
ORCP 17, [FN6] is hardly unique to *158 family law litigation. If Bidna 
were correct, the same considerations would, logically, warrant the 
wholesale abolition of the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings. 
FN5. ORS 20.105 provides, in part: 
"In any civil action, suit or other proceeding in a district court, a circuit 
court or the Oregon Tax Court, or in any civil appeal to or review by the 
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney fees to a party against whom a claim, defense or ground for 
appeal or review is asserted, if that party is a prevailing party in the 
proceeding and to be paid by the party asserting the claim, defense or 
ground, upon a finding by the court that the party willfully disobeyed a 
court order or that there was no objectively reasonable basis for asserting 
the claim, defense or ground for appeal." 
FN6. ORCP 17 provides, in part: 
"A. Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record * * *. The 
signature constitutes a certificate that the person has read the pleading, 
motion or other paper, that to the best of the knowledge, information and 
belief of the person formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument * * *, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
ii * * * * * 
"C. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, 
the court upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, * * * an appropriate sanction, which may include an 
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other 
paper, including a reasonable attorney fee." 
Finally, unlike the court in Bidna, we do not believe that the potential for tort 
liability will chill the prosecution of meritorious family law claims. The rigorous 
(continued...) 
9 
sweeping public policy exception to a recognized tort were to come from any source in 
this state, it properly would be the prerogative of the Legislature, not the Courts, to 
examine empirical data and ascertain whether any negative policy effect in fact exists in 
this state from the application of the abusive litigation torts to divorce actions. 
The remaining arguments of defendants concerning the abusive litigation torts 
were anticipated and have already been fully addressed by Lynn in his Opening Brief, 
so will not be repeated here.8 Lynn has properly pleaded a claim under the 
requirements of Rule 8 and the tort at issue, and the dismissal should be reversed. 
II. THE OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY BY FOSTER FAMILY PROPERTIES, L.C. AND 
FOSTER RENTALS, L.C. WAS IN NO WAY IN ISSUE IN THE DIVORCE ACTION. 
In an effort to avoid slander of title liability to Foster Family Properties, L.C. and 
Foster Rentals, L.C, both the Lawyers' Brief and Cathie's Brief apparently suggest that 
a dispute over whether Lynn and Cathie owned the real property or whether Foster 
Family Properties and Foster Rentals owned the real property was at issue in the 
7(...continued) 
requirements for pleading and proving wrongful use claims, especially the 
requirements of malice and lack of probable cause in prosecuting the underlying 
action, adequately shield those who act in good faith. 
8Lynn does wish to address one palpable misstatement in the factual statement 
of the Lawyers' Brief, at 6, H 10. The Lawyers' Brief argues in that factual statement 
that "Lynn moved to alter or amend Judge Bohling's order on April 8, 2004, arguing 
that a California decision issued almost ten years before oral argument on Saunders' 
motion, Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083 (Cal. 1994), constituted intervening and 
controlling authority justifying reversal." Id. (emphasis added). Lynn did cite such 
case in his Rule 59 motion, for the purpose of demonstrating the "error in law" justifying 
an amended judgment under Rule 59(a)(7). The false contention in the Lawyers' Brief 
that Lynn argued that such case was "intervening and controlling authority" is 
inexplicable, in light of the plain absence of any such statements in Lynn's 
memorandum. See R. 642-643. 
10 
divorce action. See Lawyers' Brief at 17-19; Cathie's Brief at 13-16. That is certainly 
not pleaded anywhere in the Amended Complaint and also is simply not true. 
The defendants cite several cases to the effect that divorce courts retain 
jurisdiction over properties fraudulently transferred or acquired long before the divorce. 
That may be, but those were not the circumstances in the Foster divorce. Cathie had 
signed quit claim deeds many years before the divorce, to independent legal entities. 
She did not challenge those deeds in the divorce and did not seek to bring in the 
transferees, Foster Family Properties and Foster Rentals, as parties, to assert any legal 
or equitable challenge to their ownership. Indeed, both entities were successful in quiet 
title actions against Lynn and Cathie. The respective ownership interests of Cathie and 
Lynn in the entity Foster Rentals were clearly subject to the divorce court's jurisdiction, 
but the property of non-party Foster Rentals clearly was not. 
First, neither Lynn nor Cathie even owned any portion of Foster Family 
Properties, L.C., R. 295, so ownership of that entity and real estate owned by that entity 
could not touch upon a division of the marital estate in the divorce. The slander of title 
contained in Cathie's affidavit concerning Foster Family Properties' good and 
marketable title to real property could not be covered by the judicial privilege. While 
Foster Family Properties, L.C. released Cathie Foster from any slander of title claim for 
any publications she made of her affidavit, however, and so no suit was brought against 
her in this case on that claim, no such release was granted to defendant Saunders or 
the law firm for their own publications of that slander of Foster Family Properties' good 
and marketable title. The release of Cathie and dismissal with prejudice of claims 
based on her commission of a tort also cannot release, or act as claim preclusion 
11 
concerning, the separate torts committed by defendant Saunders in publishing the 
slander of title. 
As to Foster Rentals, L.C., Lynn and Cathie owned portions of the company, as 
to which other person owned portions as well. While the ownership of that portion of 
Foster Rentals, L.C. that was owned by Lynn and by Cathie was subject to division in 
the divorce proceeding, the ownership of the remaining portion of Foster Rentals, L.C. 
was completely unrelated to the divorce. Similarly, while a valuation of Foster Rentals, 
L.C. as a business might have been relevant to assigning a value to each of Lynn and 
Cathie's percentage of ownership of the company, Cathie's affidavit stating that she 
and Lynn owned real property that she in fact had quit-claimed to the company many 
years earlier, which transfers were not challenged, is a slander of the company's good 
and marketable title in real property utterly unrelated to the divorce. No order of the 
divorce court could take away the real estate owned by Foster Family Properties or 
Foster Rentals, L.C. Cathie's contention to the contrary in her affidavit was simply a 
knowingly false statement that slandered the title of non-parties and caused them to 
incur special damages to obtain decrees quieting title. A claim has clearly been stated 
and judicial privilege as an affirmative defense is not proven by the Amended 
Complaint's allegations. 
III. SLANDER OF TITLE IS AN INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY. 
On the issue of the applicable limitations period for slander of title, defendants 
again cite many cases from other jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions, however, do not 
have a decided Supreme Court case, as we do in Utah, distinguishing slander of title 
from the personal tort of slander, and plainly defining the tort as one of injury caused to 
12 
real property. See Lynn's Opening Brief at 30-32. The effort in Cathie's Brief to 
distinguish Bass v. Planned Management Servs., Inc., 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988), and 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Howard v. Hudson, 
259 F.2d 29, 32 (9th Cir. 1958), see Lynn's Opening Brief at 32, is based on a 
misreading of Bass. Cathie argues, wrongly, that Bass "stated that slander of title 
actions are different than slander of a person because slander of title relates to the 
economic injury to an individual caused by defamation rather than a person's 
reputation." Cathie's Brief at 21. This characterization of the language of Bass, is 
simply wildly at variance with the actual language of the case, which, in discussing the 
"economic injury" that defendants vaguely gloss over, plainly required "a specific 
monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the saleability or use of the property, 
[or else] there is no damage." Bass, 761 P.2d at 568. Injury to the value of the 
property is the gravamen of the action. There is therefore no analytical basis to 
distinguish Howard, and Utah's specific, three-year, injury to property limitations period 
must apply.9 
IV. CLAIM PRECLUSION CANNOT BE DECIDED O N THE PLEADINGS. 
Defendants bear the burden to prove to this court that claim preclusion applies.10 
defendants are correct that no Utah case, Bass or later, has specifically had to 
hold on that issue. The fact that those courts properly refrained from issuing advisory 
dicta does not change the clear and logical result of what Bass did hold, when a Court, 
like this Court, must hold on the issue. 
10ln Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance, 2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663, the Utah 
Supreme Court made this burden clear: 
The party moving a court to dismiss on claim preclusion grounds bears the 
(continued...) 
13 
The judgment in the quiet title action in the Foster Rentals, L.C. v. Foster, after quieting 
title in Foster Rentals, L.C, as against both Lynn and Cathie, dismissed the remaining 
claim for slander of title without prejudice. To prove otherwise, defendants would have 
had to produce a judgment that said so, and they did not. Nor does the Amended 
Complaint plead any adjudication on the merits of the slander of title claim. Therefore, 
defendants cannot prove the necessary third element.11 No other set of facts, other 
than that there was no adjudication on the merits, may be inferred from the Amended 
Complaint. 
As to the Foster Family Properties case, a stipulated order quieting title and 
releasing Cathie was entered, dismissing the slander of title claim against her, with 
prejudice. That is why no claim was pleaded against Cathie for slandering Foster 
Family Properties' title. There was no release of any claims against Saunders or law 
firm for their own commission of the tort of slander of title and there can be no inference 
10(...continued) 
burden of establishing three elements, Maoris & Assocs., 2000 UT 93 at fl 20, 16 
P.3d 1214 which are: 
"First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. 
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been 
presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should have 
been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in 
a final judgment on the merits" 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 
1988)); see also Culbertson, 2001 UT 108 at If 13, 44 P.3d 642. All three 
elements must be established for claim preclusion to apply. See Madsen, 769 
P.2d at 247. 
Miller, 2002 UT 6 fi 58, 44 P.3d at 678. 
11
"According to the third element, '[a]n adjudication upon the merits is ... required 
[to establish] claim preclusion.'" Id. H 59. 
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against Lynn that they did not commit their own acts in slander of Foster Family 
Properties title. They are liable for their own acts, regardless of what Cathie did or did 
not do. They were not parties to any prior action and no claims were asserted against 
them previously. Thus, they cannot meet their burden on their own torts, regardless of 
what Cathie did for which she was released. 
V. CATHIE'S ARGUMENTS ON DUTY, LEGAL CAUSE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE 
GROUNDLESS, CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CATHIE AND 
COUILLARD ON COUNTS IV AND V. 
Cathie's argument that her filing of a purportedly joint tax return with the Internal 
Revenue Service that contained materially false statements about Lynn's deductions 
and individual filing status was not a legal cause of the audit he endured is difficult to 
fathom. Her conduct hardly seems to be so removed from Lynn's injury, a la Palsgraf, 
that it could be deemed unforeseeable. Indeed, the IRS seems to publicize in the 
newspapers the various investigations they undertake due to red flags that are raised, 
and it hardly seems that reporting false information to the IRS would not be deemed a 
red flag. Of course, whether the false information was the cause-in-fact of the audit 
might be open to debate, but the trial court's refusal to grant relief under Rule 56(f) to 
allow discovery of the IRS to make that factual link, when discovery had not yet been 
allowed to commence, was a clear abuse of discretion. Cathie also does not explain 
how, having undertaken to make representations to the IRS about Lynn, she escapes 
any duty to make those representations in a non-negligent fashion so as not to trigger 
an audit of Lynn. 
Of course, Count IV deals with negligent breach of duty. Count V deals with an 
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intentional interference with Lynn's prospective economic relations. While Cathy 
argues that those relations must be "business relations," she offers no explanation of 
why the delay in receiving a refund that resulted in lost investment income is not a 
"business relation." The right to invest in securities, or even certificates of deposit, most 
certainly are business relations as to which Lynn was deprived and he is entitled to 
recover his resulting investment loss under the tort of intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage. Again, the issue of cause-in-fact could not be proven 
without discovery from the IRS, and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
uphold the rule 56(f) objection to summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and Rule 56 judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed, as should its refusal to allow discovery, and the entire case should be 
reinstated and remanded to allow discovery and further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \^c day of February, 2005. 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
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